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In 2001-02, Argentina experienced a wrenching economic crisis. Plan Jefes, 
implemented in May 2002, was Argentina's institutional response to the 
increases in unemployment and poverty triggered by the crisis. The program 
provided a social safety net and appears to have successfully protected families 
against indigence. Despite this success, the continued existence of the program, 
which provides benefits to eligible unemployed individuals for an unlimited 
duration, may have unappealing long-term consequences. Reliance on the plan 
may reduce the incentive to search for work and in the long-rnn may damage 
individual employability and perpetuate poverty. Motivated by these concerns, 
this paper examines the effect of participating in Plan Jefes on the probability 
of exiting from unemployment. Regardless of the data set, the specification, 
the empirical approach and the control group, the evidence assembled in this 
paper shows that for the period under analysis individuals enrolled in the Plan 
are at least 20 percentage points less likely to .transit to employment as 
compared to individuals who are not on the Plan. The negative effect of the 
program tends to be larger for females and as a consequence, over time, the 
program becomes increasingly feminized. Prima facie, the estimates suggest 
that programs such as Plan J efes need to re-consider the balance between 
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UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE AND TRANSITION TO 
EMPLOYMENT IN ARGENTINA 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Since 1994, Argentina has experienced double-digit unemployment rates. 
Between 1993 and 2003 the number of unemployed workers doubled from 
about 1.1 million to 2.2 million workers translating into an increase in the 
unemployment rate from 9.6 to 15.6 percent, with a peak of 19.7 percent in 
2002 (see Table 1). 
Successive administrations in Atgentina have used a variety of passive and 
active labor market interventions to protect workers against the consequences 
of unemployment. While there are several initiatives, at the moment the 
Argentinean system of unemployment compensation is dominated by a passive 
unemployment insutance (UI) program and an active unemployment assistance 
(UA) program called Plan Jefasy Jefts de Hogar Desoc11pados (ProgratJJ far UnetJJplqyed 
Heads oJH011seholds), hereafter Plan Jefes. 
The unemployment insurance (UI) program was created in 1991 and 
ptovides monthly income support to unemployed workers previously engaged 
in the formal sector and able to show contributions to the social security 
system. The amount of the benefit and the length of entitlement depends on 
individual labor histories and differs across individuals. The number of workers 
receiving benefits through this scheme peaked in 2002, surpassing 200,000 (see 
Table 2). 
The gamut of active labor market programs includes job placement 
services, fiscal incentives for hiring firms and training programs for the 
unemployed. The largest program, Plan J efes, has been in place since 2002. 
This program was the institutional response to the explosive increase in 
poverty and unemployment that Atgentina experienced at the end of 2001. In 
theory, it consists of a monthly allowance for eligible unemployed household 
heads. The benefit is granted on a flat-rate basis for an unlimited duration. To 
ensute that the program is self-targeted and reaches those who are most in 
need, a key aspect of the Plan is the requirement that participants provide a 
labour contribution (a counte1part of work) which typically assumes the form 
of a communitarian task. 
A number of studies have analysed various aspects of the Plan J efes 
program. For example, Roca et al. (2003), Galasso and Ravallion (2004), 
Franceschelli (2005) examine the targeting aspects of the program as well as its 
impact on poverty alleviation. Despite some leakage these papers confirm that 
the ptogram did target the least skilled and the poor and that it protected 
individuals against poverty and indigence. While the program does seem to 
have had positive .effects, the availability of benefits for an unlimited duration 
may have unintended and unappealillg longer-term consequences. Reliance on 
the Plan may reduce the incentive to search for a job in the wider labout 
market and may damage individual employability, among other reasons, due to 
productivity deterioration (Pissarides, 1992) or statistical discrimination 
(Blanchard and Diamond, 1994). Accordingly, the availability of reliable 
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estimates on the effect of Plan J efes and more generally on the effect of 
unemployment assistance programs on the probability of exiting 
unemployment are essential for the formulation of social policies that attempt 
to achieve an appropriate balance between social security and the provision of 
adequate job search incentives. 
There is, of course, a large body of empirical literature on the effect of the 
benefit replacement rate (benefit elasticity) and duration of unemployment 
insurance/ assistance programs (duration elasticity) on spells of unemployment. 
However, for obvious reasons, this body of work is largely restricted to the 
United States and European countries. Whether unemployment benefits 
finance longer unemployment periods and reduce the probability of exiting 
unemployment in the case of developing countries and Argentina in particular, 
is not clear. The large scale of Argentina's unemployment assistance program 
combined with scarce knowledge on the effects of such programs on job-
search incentives (moral hazard) provides the motivation for our paper. 
While the spirit of this paper is similar to the existing literature on the 
effect of unemployment insurance programs on unemployment duration, there 
are noteworthy differences. First, while we do study the effect of 
unemployment insurance, the main focus of the paper is on the effect of Plan 
J efes. Second, the institutional arrangement of the program under scmtiny is 
different from the system prevailing in a number of developed countries. In 
Argentina, large fiscal deficits have limited the generosity of the unemployment 
assistance program. Faced by a tradeoff between coverage and replacement 
rate, the J efes program favors the former and provides a monthly benefit of 
Pesos 150 (a rate below the minimum wage) to all beneficiaries for an 
unlimited duration. This is unlike the unemployment insurance/ assistance 
programs examined in the bulk of the empirical literature which tend to 
provide a relatively higher level of benefits for a limited duration. Third, 
consistent with the design of the Jefes program, we do not estimate duration 
and benefit elasticities but examine the effect of participating in Plan J efes on 
the probability of exiting to employment. 
To preview our results, we find that, regardless of the data set, the 
specification or the empirical approach, individuals enrolled in the Plan are far 
less likely to transit to employment as compared to individuals who are not on 
the plan. This result holds regardless of whether Plan participants are 
compared to all non-Plan participants or whether the comparison is restricted 
to those who applied for the Plan but do not receive benefits. The effects of 
the program are gender sensitive. Program participation exerts a much stronger 
negative effect on the probability of transiting to employment for females, and 
as a consequence, over time, the program becomes increasingly feminized. 
Prima facie, the estimates support the idea that by reducing unemployment 
costs and thereby increasing rese1-vation wages and reducing job-search 
intensity the Plan reduces the probability of transiting to employment. 
Alternative explanations for the reduced probability of transiting to 
employment are also discussed. 
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section II provides 
additional information on the unemployment insurance and assistance systems. 
Section III describes the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section IV 
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presents an empirical framework tailored to the problem and data at hand. 
Section V presents the empirical findings while the final section summarizes 
and concludes the paper. 
2 UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
Argentina has experienced sharp increases in unemployment and 
underemployment rates in the 1990s. As displayed in Table 1, unemployment 
rose from a low of 6.5 percent in 1991 to a high of almost 20 percent during 
the economic crisis. While the recent recove1y of the economy has been 
accompanied by a decline in unemployment, the rate still hovers between 10 to 
12 percent, considerably higher than the rate at the beginning of the 1990s. 
The quality of jobs, as measured by the underemployment rate and the degree 
of informal sector work has also declined. While 9.4 percent of the employed 
were classified as underemployed in the early 1990s, the figure was about 22 
percent in 2003. During the same perlod, the percentage of workers employed 
outside the regulated market rose from 30 to 45 percent. The decline in the 
quantity and quality of employment is reflected in the sharp increase in the 
incidence of poverty. 
2.1 Unemployment Insurance 
The increase in unemployment since the 1990s has usually been interpreted in 
the context of economic reforms initiated at the beginning of the 1990s. These 
reforms included privatization, deregulatory and trade-openness policies. In the 
labor arena, reforms were aimed at creating a more flexible labor market 
(Lanari, 2003) and included measures to reduce the costs of layoffs and 
encourage short term contracts (Campos, 2000). In anticipation of the increase 
in unemployment, the government introduced limited duration unemployment 
insurance at the end of 1991. According to the Employment Law of 1991, the 
UI scheme was introduced as the legal mechanism to "regulate the impact of 
the processes of productive conversion and structural refo1ms on 
employment" . Thus, UI was introduced in a labor ma1·ket characterized by the 
absence of protection for unemployment and at a time when increases in 
unemployment were seen as inevitable. 
In terms of eligibility, unemployment insurance may be accessed by 
unemployed workers who have contributed to the scheme for at least six 
months during the three years preceding unemployment. The level of benefits 
is determined by a Council of Productivity, Employment and Minimum Wage 
and is based on the highest net wage earned in the six months preceding 
unemployment. The duration of entitlement depends on the time period and 
level of contributions and ranges from 2 to 12 months. In addition to 
searching for jobs while receiving benefits, recipients are obliged to accept jobs 
offered by the labor authority. 
The UI system offers limited protection to workers. Since its introduction, 
the share of unemployed receiving insurance has remained between 5 and 7.5 
percent (Social Security Secretariat, www.seguridadsocial.gov.ar). While 
exclusion has been obse1ved in countries with a longer histo1y of 
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unemployment insurance, Argentina also displays a high level of exclusion. The 
system excludes informal workers and regardless of their legal status, several 
categories of workers such as domestic workers and self employed are also 
excluded from participation (Roca et al., 2003). Thus, similar to the situation in 
other Latin American countries, UI is an instrument of limited scope that does 
not provide benefits to the poorest (Samaniego, 2002). In general, the scheme 
benefits middle-income salaried workers (Mazza, 2000). 
2.2 Unemployment Assistance 
Ten years after the introduction of the UI scheme, in the context of a severe 
economic crisis, the govemment introduced an unemployment assistance 
scheme, called Plan Jefes. The plan was the institutional response to the 
increase in poverty and unemployment triggered by the crisis. The decree 
accompanying the creation of the scheme declared that the Plan aims to 
"guarantee the right to social inclusion to all Argentinean families" (Decree 
No. 565/2002). The program was signed into law in April 2002 and between 
April 4 and May 17, 2002, individuals could apply and register for the program. 
Individuals who met the eligibility conditions were issued social security cards 
and registered in a national data base (for more details see Tcherneva and 
Wray, 2005). For the most part, individuals who did not register by May 17 
were unable to join the program. 
The scheme is targeted at less-skilled unemployed workers and the 
objectives of the program are to provide a short-term safety net while at the 
same time increasing employability through training activities. In terms of 
statutoty requirements, the scheme is restricted to unemployed household 
heads (implicitly, one person per household) with children aged 18 or less or 
those with handicapped children irrespective of age. 
To ensure self-targeting, Plan benefits were set below the minimum wage 
and all participants receive the same benefit o f Pesos 150 a month for an 
unlimited duration. In addition, individuals enrolled in the scheme are expected 
to search for jobs while at the same time they are expected to cauy out on e or 
more of the following activities (i) complete formal education or engage in 
training activities (ii) provide a labor (counterpart work) contribution of up to 
20 hours a week for communitarian activities such as maintenance and 
constmction of social infrastmcture, cleaning of public spaces, sanitaty and 
health supporting activities, childcare (Roca et al., 2003) (iii) perform 
administrative tasks in local agencies or work in ente1prises associated with the 
Plan. 
In contrast to the UI program, the UA scheme is inclusive. Since 2002, the 
scheme has provided benefits to about 1.5-1.9 million individuals per year or 
about 13 to 15 percent of the labor force. Total expenditure on the Plan 
amounts to about 1 percent of GDP (Tchemeva and Wray, 2005). Most of the 
Plan participants (about 84 percent) are engaged in communitarian activities 
and contributing 20 hours of labor under the aegis of Plan "is their prima1y 
labor market activity (Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security 
(MTESS), 2004). 
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While the Plan was intended for unemployed heads of household, in 
practice, these requirements were not fulfilled. Administrators did not ensure 
that applicants were really heads of households and nor is it clear that only the 
unemployed were admitted into the Plan. Anecdotal evidence as well as formal 
analysis in Galasso and Ravallion (2004) shows that many Jefes participants, 
almost exclusively women, were inactive before joining the program. The 
implications of this, for our analysis, are discussed later on in the text. 
2.3 Measuring Unemployment 
Conventionally, official statistics in Argentina treat beneficiaries of social plans 
who contribute any type oflabor as employed. In the case of Plan J efes, the 
inadequacy of applying this definition was noted at the outset. The labor or 
counterpart work requirement of the Plan was introduced to ensure self-
targeting and should not be viewed as employment. In fact, the requirement 
that most Plan participants should be providing a labor contribution was a 
condition for World Bank financing (Galasso and Ravallion, 2004). An 
application of the conventional definition, given the scale of Plan J efes and the 
condition that a large proportion of beneficiaries should and indeed do provide 
20 hours of labor, would lead to an extremely misleading picture of the 
counuy's level of unemployment. Furthermore, the Plan is intended to provide 
a short-term social safety net for the unemployed and Plan beneficiaries are 
expected to search for alternative jobs. In such circumstances treating those 
who provide a labor contribution as employed is clearly not suitable. 
Official statistics have been adapted to distinguish between employment 
derived from the Plan (assisted employment) and other employment 
(unassisted employment). As a result, the Argentinian Bureau of Statistics 
(INDEC) periodically presents different sets of labor market indicators, based 
on alternative classifications of beneficiaries. In this paper, we treat individuals 
that report the Plan as their main activity as unemployed. Those who are in 
training are considered inactive while those who work in local agencies or in 
enterprises associated with the Plan and for whom the Plan is a seconda1y 
activity, are considered as employed. 
3 DATA 
The analysis conducted in this paper is based on three rounds of data collected 
under the auspices of the Permanent Household Smvey (EPH) by INDEC. 
The EPH is an urban household survey, which till 2003 was conducted twice a 
year, usually in May and October. The survey is conducted in provincial 
capitals and areas with a population of more 100,000. It covers 28 urban 
agglomerates and represents about 61 percent of the counuy's population 
(INDEC, 2001). 
The survey has a rotating panel strncture with 25 percent of households 
replaced in each round. The May and October 2002 covered about 50,000 
individuals in the working age population (16-64) while the May 2003 sample 
was smaller and covered around 37,000 individuals. In principle, based on the 
sample design and in the absence of sample attrition, of the households 
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sampled in May 2002, 75 percent should still appear in the October 2002 
survey, while 50 percent should appear in the May 2003 survey. 
The sUl"vey contains detailed information on a variety of household and 
individual characteristics, including information on employment, incomes, 
household demographics, housing, and education. From the point of view of 
this paper, the key data contained in these sUl"veys is the availability of 
information on the employment experience of individuals. The surveys collect 
information on the labor market status of individuals (employed, unemployed, 
inactive), whether they receive unemployment benefits (insurance or 
assistance) whether they have applied for unemployment assistance and the 
date at which they started receiving unemployment benefits. 
PlanJefes was implemented in April-May 2002 and the October 2002 
sUl"vey contains information on Plan participation. The su1vey also elicits 
information on the date that individuals who receive unemployment benefits 
started receiving such benefits. This allows us to determine whether an 
individual has been receiving benefits since May 2002. We are, thus, able to 
obse1ve the labor market status as well as unemployment benefits status of 
individuals in May 2002, October 2002 and May 2003. We cannot go beyond 
this smvey as several aspects of the EPH changed after May 2003, making it 
impossible to merge information across additional smveys. Accordingly, the 
analysis presented in the paper is based on merging information contained in 
the May 2002, October 2002 and May 2003 rounds of the EPH. 
Information contained in the three individual data sets are used to create 
two panels. The first of these covers a 12 month period and combines 
information contained in the May 2002, October 2002 and May 2003 surveys. 
The second combines information from the October 2002 and May 2003 data 
sets. The one-year panel allows us to obse1ve the labor m arket status of 
individuals at three points in time but it has fewer obse1vations, while for the 
shorter six month panel we have a larger number of observations but can 
observe transitions only b etween October 2002 and May 2003. Restricting 
oUl"selves to individuals in the working age population (aged 16 to 64) yielded 
12,576 common observations for the period covering May 2002 to May 2003 
and 22,947 common obse1vations for the period October 2002 to May 2003. 
Based on the sample design and adjusting for the smallest sample (May 
2003), we expected about 18,000 observations in the longer panel and about 
27,750 in the shorter panel. While the actual numbers fall short of these 
expected figures by about 5,250-5,500, there does not seem to be a systematic 
difference between the individual data sets and the merged panels. For 
example, for all three smveys and for the two merged panels the gender and 
educational compositions of the data sets do not show much variation (see 
Table A1) . Overall, these comparisons suggest that despite the smaller than 
expected sample size the merged data sets are not unduly influenced by sample 
attrition. 
The focus of our analysis is on unemployed individuals and in the 12 
month panel there are 1,455 individuals who were unemployed at the 
beginning of the period. These individuals may be divided into foUl" categories. 
T he first category consists of those who do not receive any unemployment 
benefits (69 percent). The second category includes those who were enrolled 
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in the Plan in May 2002 (about 23 percent). The third category comprises 
individuals who have applied for the Plan but do not receive benefits (about 
6.5 percent) . The Plan limited entry to those who had qualified and enrolled by 
May 17, 2002, thus, there is a set of individuals who have applied for the Plan 
and who may meet the program's requirements but at the time of the smvey 
were still awaiting the decision of the labor authorities. The availability of 
individuals who fulfill the requirements of the Plan and have applied for it, 
provides a control group that is potentially similar in terms of obse1ved and 
unobserved characteristics to those who do join the plan. The fourth category 
consists of individual who have access to unemployment insurance (1.8 
percent). In the 6 month panel there are 3,161 individuals and of these about 
60 percent do not receive any benefits, 31 percent are on the Plan, 6.5 percent 
have applied for the Plan but do not receive any benefits and the remaining 2 
percent receive UI benefits. 
4 AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Theoretical Responses to Plan Jefes (Unemployment 
Benefit Schemes) 
While unemployment compensation schemes are expected to exert several 
influences on the labor market behavior of individuals (see Meyer, 2002 and 
Vodopevic, 2004), the bulk of the literature focuses on the effect of 
unemployment compensation schemes on the probability of re-employment 
and the time spent out of work. Static labor supply models (for example, 
Moffitt and Nicholson, 1982) as well as job-search models (such as Mortensen, 
1986) have been used to examine the effect of unemployment insurance/ 
assistance schemes on the probability of re-employment and duration of 
unemployment. Both approaches predict that individuals enrolled in 
unemployment schemes are less likely to exit to employment and that 
enrollment in schemes with a higher replacement ratio and a longer duration of 
benefits prolongs unemployment spells. 
Invoking a job-search model and based on our knowledge of the 
organization of PlanJefes, consider an unemployed worker searching for jobs 
in a decentralized labor market. In the spirit of Mortensen (1977, 1986) and 
Meyer (2002) assume that this worker chooses a job-search intensity (JJ and a 
minimally acceptable (rese1vation) job-quality (q), which for simplicity may be 
thought of as a function of the minimum wages and minimum job tenure 
sought by the unemployed worker. For a given job-search intensity the workers 
face a known job-quality offer distribution and a constant probability of 
receiving job offers, (11.(s)). The probability of exiting unemployment may be 
defined as A(s) [1 -F(q)], where Fis the cumulative distribution function of job-
quality offers. If an unemployed worker is offered a job at a quality that 
exceeds the reservation job-quality, it is accepted, and she transits to 
employment. 
Given this set up let us consider the effect of Plan Jefes. Individuals 
enrolled in PlanJefes receive monthly monetary payments which are set at a 
level below the minimum wage for an unlimited duration of time. Although 
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Plan benefits may be low, given the unlimited duration of benefits (security of 
tenure as long as the program lasts), and the expectation of additional benefits, 
Plan participants clearly face a lower cost of being unemp loyed (higher cost of 
exiting to employment) as compared to non-participants. Accordingly, Plan 
participation may be associated with reduced search intensity, increases in 
rese1vation job-quality and a lower probability of exiting to employment. More 
explicitly, this discussion yields two clear predictions. First, Plan participants 
should have a lower probability of exiting to employment as compared to non-
participants and second, the quality of jobs accepted by Plan participants 
should be higher than the quality of jobs accepted by non-participants. 
Plan J efes participants receive the same benefits for an unlimited duration 
of time. The benefits were fixed at the commencement of the program and are 
not indexed to inflation. Thus, the real value of benefits declines over time. 
Over time, the erosion of Plan benefits should lead to an increase in the cost 
of being unemployed which in turn should enhance search intensity, reduce 
reservation job-quality and lead to an increase in the probability of transiting 
to employment. Even without inflation, an increase in the transition rate over 
time is consistent with the argument that the availability of unemployment 
benefits allows recipients to search for a better job match. Since recipients may 
not be forced to accept the first job they are offered, after an initial period of 
low transition their probability of exiting to employment may increase. Thus, 
the third prediction yielded by this framework is that, over time, Plan 
participants should display a greater probability of exiting to employment. 
The empirical work presented in the paper examines two of these three 
predictions, namely, whether Plan participation reduces the probability of 
exiting to employment and whether the probability of exiting to employment 
increases over time. Apart from information on the monthly wages of the jobs 
to which individuals transit we do not have much information on job quality 
and accordingly, the expectation that individuals on the plan transit to higher 
quality jobs is not examined in detail. 
4.2 Empirical Strategy and Specification 
The main empirical challenge in the pap er is to isolate the effect of Plan J efes 
on the probability of exiting unemployment, after controlling for various o ther 
factors that may influence job-search intensity and rese1vation job-quality. 
Accordingly, the probability of exiting to employment, P(Y; =1) = (A.(s)[1-
F(q)]), is treated as a function of obse1ved characteristics that influence job-
search intensity (s) and rese1vation job quality (q), that is, 
P(~ = 1) = 
G(/30 + f3wUI + /JPJP!an Jefes +/]AA+ /311 + /JHHH + /3u.1 LM) (1) 
Several variants of (1) are estimated as a logit model. UI and PlanJefes 
indicate whether an individual receives unemployment insurance benefits or 
benefits through Plan J efes, respectively. Individuals who have applied to Plan 
Jefes but do not receive any benefits are categorized as applicants (A). The 
reference category consists of those who do not receive any type of 
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unemployment benefits and have never applied for benefits. I and HH are 
individual characteristics (gender, age, marital status, education), household 
demographic (family size, number of children younger than 14, number of 
earning household members) and wealth characteristics (access to water and 
electricity, type of dwelling, household density), respectively. IM is a set of 
labor market characteristics. These characteristics include regional fixed effects, 
a variable that indicates whether an individual had any job experience prior to 
being unemployed, information on whether the contract for the job held just 
prior to being unemployed was temporary, ad-hoc or permanent, whether the 
individual was a wage employee or self-employed, and indicators for the size of 
firm of an individual's last job. 
In (1 ), the effect of Plan J efes on transiting to employment is compared 
with the transition rate of non-participants. Despite controlling for a number 
of characteristics, it is possible that comparisons between Plan participants and 
non-participants are not appropriate. The available data contains information 
on individuals who have applied for the Plan but do not receive benefits. Since 
applicants may have been eligible to join the Plan, on avera ge, they are likely 
to have obse1ved characteristics that are similar to those on the Plan. 
Furthermore, since these individuals have applied for the plan and have 
indicated a preference for program participation, it is possible that, on average, 
their unobse1ved c haracteristics are similar to the unobse1ved characteristics 
of Plan participants. Thus, we estimate a second set of logit models where 
applicants are treated as the appropriate control group and the estimation is 
restricted to Plan participants and applicants, that is, 
P(Y; = l)=G(/30 + /JPJP!an Jefes + /3J + /3HHH + /3IMLM) (2) 
These logit models control for obse1vables, how ever, they impose a 
specific functional f01m on the relationship between Plan participation and the 
probability of transiting to employment. An alternative approach relies on 
propensity score matching to control for observable heterogeneity between 
Plan participants and non-participants/ applicants. Plan participants are 
matched to obse1v ationally similar non-participants/ applicants and thereafter 
the average treatment effect (on the treated) of Plan participation on 
employment transitions is computed. 
Let Pf; indicate participation in Plan Jefes. Following Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983), propensity scores, that is, Pr ob(P J; = 11 X;), are obtained from 
a logit regression of Plan participation on obse1ved characteristics (X). The 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATI) when N Plan J efes participants 
are matched to C non-participants (NP) may be written as, 
(3) 
Similarly, the AIT when Plan participants are matched to applicants (A) 
may be written as, 
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(4) 
Yi indicates the outcome for each of the different groups and Wij are the 
weights that are used to calculate the counterfactual outcome for each Plan 
participant. Provided that unobserved characteristics of Plan participants and 
applicants are similar, the A TI provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of 
Plan Jefes on employment transitions. The ATI is estimated using five nearest-
neighbor and kernel matching and the estimates are restricted to the region of 
common support. 
Both the approaches outlined here control for differences in observed 
characteristics and rely on the assumption that using a control group that has 
applied for the Plan is likely to deliver unbiased estimates of the effect of the 
Plan on transiting to employment. In their work on evaluating the effect of 
Plan Jefes on various outcomes, Galasso and Ravallion (2004) also use 
matching methods to create a control group from a sample of applicants. 
Thereafter, they compute the A TI of Plan J efes on various outcomes using a 
single-difference estimator and a double-difference estimator. In our case, 
since we follow individuals with the same outcome at the start of the period 
(they are all unemployed), the single- and double-difference estimators do not 
differ. While the double-difference estimator controls for differences in time-
invariant unobservables, Galasso and Ravallion (2004) treat the single-
difference estimates as their preferred results. Additionally, for most of the 
outcomes their single- and double-difference estimators yield similar results, 
suggesting that the use of applicants as a control group mitigates concerns 
about the effect of unobse1-ved characteristics. Nevertheless, in the spirit of a 
sensitivity analysis we do attempt to control for the effect of unobse1-vables 
using selection models. 
The two-state models discussed so far ignore the probability that 
individuals may also transit to inactivity. While focusing on the two-states is 
similar to the approach adopted in the bulk of the empirical literature, a more 
complete picture of unemployment transitions should be concerned not just 
with transitions to employment but also transitions to inactivity. Given the aim 
of this paper it is crucial to examine the effect of the Plan on transitions to 
employment after controlling for its effect on inactivity. As may be 
anticipated, the Plan attracted individuals who were previously inactive and 
declared themselves as active and unemployed in order to access Plan benefits. 
Ignoring this possibility is likely to inflate the (negative) effect of Plan J efes on 
transition to employment. To deal with this key concern we use three different 
approaches. 
First, we estimate equations (1)-(4) separately for males and females. As 
shown by Galasso and Ravallion (2004), as compared to applicants, Plan Jefes 
reduced the labor force inactivity of women by 21-27 percentage points but 
did not have any effect on the labor force inactivity of men. Accordingly, for 
men, the effect of Plan J efes on the probability of transiting to employment is 
unaffected by inactivity concerns and the effect of the Plan on men's transition 
probability may be thought of as the appropriate magnitude of the Plan's 
impact. 
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Second, although there is no information on whether Plan J efes 
participants were unemployed or in reality inactive before joining the program 
it is possible to combine information from the May 2002 and October 2002 
surveys and draw a distinction between these two states at least for the 12 
month panel. The October 2002 round allows us to identify, (previously 
unemployed or inactive) individuals who are on the Plan and who started 
receiving benefits in May. T he May 2002 smvey asks all unemployed 
individuals to provide information on the characteristics of the job they held 
prior to becoming unemployed. This information is not available for those 
who were inactive in May 2002 and comparing the number of people who 
provide this information with those on the Plan allows us to identify 
individuals who were certainly unemployed before joining the program. Thus, 
we also present estimates of equation (1) and (2) for the 12 month panel after 
removing individuals for whom we do not have information on the job held 
prior to becoming unemployed. 
As a final step to account for inactivity, we go beyond a two-state model 
and explicitly estimate the probability of Plan Jefes on transiting to 
employment and to inactivity. To do so, we estimate the specifications outlined 
in equation (1) and (2) using a three-state multinomial logit model. 
4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 3 and Table A2 contain descriptive statistics for the longer and shorter 
panel, respectively. The info1mation is presented for the samples as a whole 
and conditional on Plan participation or applicant status. As shown in Table 3, 
for the sample as a whole, about 40 percent of the unemployed are household 
heads and 60 percent are male. The average age of an 1.memployed individual is 
34 years and about 18 percent have had some form of tertiary education. A 
comparison of the means across Plan status shows that except for a few of the 
observed characteristics there are sharp differences between Plan and non-Plan 
individuals. While 35 percent of non-Plan individuals are household heads, the 
figme for Plan participants is 47 percent. This is surprising, as in principle, only 
unemployed household heads are eligible for the program. However, as is 
clear, the condition that Plan Jefes participants must be household heads was 
not closely followed by program administrators. 
A majority (65 percent) of non-Plan individuals are male, in contrast, Plan 
participation is dominated by women (66 percent). There are sharp differences 
in educational attainment. About 22 percent of the non-Plan individuals have 
some tertia1y education while the corresponding figure for Plan participants is 
8.7 percent. Consistent with the group targeted by the UA program, Plan 
participants tend to have larger household sizes and more children below the 
age of 14. Despite the educational differences, it is notable that at least for the 
smaller subset of individuals on whom there is information on the quality of 
the job they held prior to becoming unemployed, differences across groups are 
not pronounced. Both Plan and non-Plan participants have a high incidence of 
prior job experience (92 versus 85 percent). A similar proportion were wage 
employees (as opposed to being self-employed) and a similar proportion held 
tempora1y or ad-hoc jobs. Nevertheless, the overall impression emerging from 
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a comparison of the means is that Plan participants and non-Plan individuals 
have ve1y different obse1ved characteristics. 
In contrast, a comparison of Plan participants and Plan applicants shows 
that except for gender and the number of children below age 14 the two 
groups have ve1y similar obse1ved characteristics. The proportion of 
household heads, marital status, quality of job prior to becoming unemployed, 
educational and regional distribution across the two groups is not statistically 
different. Thus, while comparisons between Plan and non-Plan participants 
may not be particularly apt, at least on the basis of the similarities in the 
obse1ved characteristics of Plan participants and applicants, it does seem that 
Plan applicants are an appropriate control group for Plan participants. 
The descriptive statistics for the 6 month panel reveals a similar picture. 
While the obse1ved characteristics of Plan participants and non-Plan 
individuals differ sharply, except for a few variables, the obse1ved 
characteristics of Plan participants and Plan applicants are not statistically 
different. 
5 EFFECT OF PLAN }EFES ON TRANSITION TO EMPLOYMENT 
5.1 Labor Market Transitions 
Table 4 relies on the one-year panel and displays labor market transitions for 
the various categories between May 2002 and May 2003 while Table S provides 
information on the transitions observed in the 6 month panel. Overall, by May 
2003, of the 1,455 unemployed individuals in May 2002, about 38 percent find 
employment, a similar percentage remains unemployed while 23 percent drop 
out of the labor market. There are sharp differences in the distribution of labor 
market status conditional on receiving unemployment assistance. By May 2003, 
44 percent of those without benefits have found work, while the 
corresponding figure for those receiving unemployment assistance is 19 
percent. As shown in Table 4, due to differences in the characteristics of 
individuals on the Plan as compared to those without, comparisons may not be 
appropriate. A better comparison group may be individuals who have applied 
for UA benefits. However, even as compared with this group, Plan participants 
are substantially less likely to transit to employment. In fact, the group of 
applicants has a transition probability which is quite similar to those who do 
not receive any benefits ( 41 percent of applicants transit to employment). 
The figures for the 6 month panel follow a similar pattern. By May 2003, 
31 percent of the 3,161 individuals unemployed in October 2002 transit to 
employment. The transition rate for those without benefits (38.4 percent) and 
those on unemployment insurance is quite similar (39 .1 percent). Applicants 
have a slightly lower transition rate of 33 percent, but with a 15 percent 
transition rate, Plan J efes beneficiaries are far less likely to transit to 
employment. 
While the patterns of transition are similar for both panels, the additional 
information provided by the 12 month panel is the interesting temporal pattern 
of transition. For unemployed individuals as a whole, the bulk of the transition 
occurs between May 2002 and October 2002. 28 percent of the unemployed 
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transit to employment in the first time period while a further 10 percent of the 
original sample transits between October 2002 and May 2003. This pattern 
holds for the group not receiving any benefits as well as for applicants. As 
shown in Table 4, 36 percent of those without benefits move to employment 
in 6 months while another 8 percent transits in the following 6 months. A 
similar story holds for those who do not receive benefits but have applied for 
UA. The transition rates are 35 percent and 6 percent in the first and second 
period, respectively. The transition pattern for those who receive benefits is the 
opposite. In the first 6 months only about 4 percent of those who were 
unemployed and on the Plan move to employment. In the next 6 months the 
probability of transitioning triples from 4 percent to 14.6 percent. The increase 
in the transition rate is consistent with the idea that over time, due to the 
erosion of the real value of the benefits the cost of remaining unemployed 
increases thereby promoting transition to employment. 
5.2 Logit Estimates 
Table 6 provides estimates of equation (1) and (2). Non-participants are 
the comparison group in columns 1 and 2, while Plan applicants serve as the 
comparison group in columns 3 and 4. Column (2) and ( 4) are estimated over a 
smaller set of individuals on whom we have information on characteristics of 
the job they held prior to becoming unemployed. As explained in the previous 
section, these estimates should not be influenced by inactivity as they are 
restricted to those individuals who were certainly unemployed before joining 
PlanJefes. 
Regardless of the column that we consider, participation in Plan J efes is 
clearly associated with a reduction in the probability of transiting to 
employment. As compared to non-participants, Plan Jefes participants are 33 
to 36 percentage point less likely to transit to employment. The appropriate 
comparison in terms of identifying the causal effect of the Plan is to compare 
Plan participants with applicants and even versus this group the negative effect 
of PlanJefes is quite large and ranges from 21.6 (column 2) to 32.4 (column 4) 
percentage points. The inclusion of the labor market characteristics does not 
alter the negative effect of the Plan. Unemployment insurance also exerts a 
negative effect but it is quite small and statistically insignificant. 
Other than the effect of the Plan, the estimates in Table 6 show that males 
and household heads are far more likely to exit to employment. The effects in 
column (3) and ( 4) display that males are 19 to 23 percentage points more 
likely to exit to employment as compared to females while the effect for 
household heads ranges from 11 to 18 percent. Age has a non-linear impact. 
None of the other variables in columns (3) or (4) exert an impact on transiting 
to employment. Given the strong similarities between Plan participants and 
applicants this is not particularly surprising. 
Table 7 and 8 present gender-specific estimates of equation (1) and (2) 
based on the 12 month and the 6 month panel, respectively. As Table 7 shows, 
the marginal effect of Plan J efes is much smaller for males. As compared to 
applicants, for male Plan Jefes participants, the negative effect of the program 
lies between 13.5 (column 1) and 22.9 (column 3) percentage points while for 
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females the effect is about 40 percentage points. Based on the shorter panel, 
the negative effect for males lies between 18.6 (column 5) and 22.6 (column 2) 
while for females the effect is about 31 percentage points. As mentioned 
earlier, Plan Jefes attracted women who were inactive into the labor market, 
and treating these women as unemployed is likely to exaggerate the negative 
effect of the Plan. The substantially larger estimates for women support this 
idea. Given that the Plan has no effect on inactivity rates for men, it may be 
appropriate to view the results based on the male sample as a lower bound of 
the negative effect of the Plan on transiting to employment. 
5.3 Propensity Score Matching Estimates 
Logit specifications were used to estimate the propensity of participating in 
Plan J efes. The specifications included the individual (J), household (HH) and 
regional controls discussed above. For the one-year panel, for both sets of 
control groups, post-matching tests supported the null hypothesis of equality 
of means of each variable between the treatment and the control groups. The ~ 
similarities between the Plan J efes participants and the applicant group are 
reflected in the large regions of common support displayed in Figures 1 and 2. 
Table 9 presents ATT estimates of the program on the probability of 
transiting to employment. Following (3) and (4) these estimates are based on 
matching Plan participants to non-participants (excluding those on UI and 
applicants) and on matching Plan participants only to the pool of applicants. 
Estimates are presented for the longer and shorter panel as well as separately 
for males and females. According to the PSM estimates, Plan participants are 
about 32 to 38 percentage points less likely to transit to employment, which is 
somewhat larger than the estimates based on the logit model. The effect differs 
across gender and lies between 17 to 26 percentage points for men and is 
about 40 percentage points for women. Notwithstanding the larger effect for 
the total sample, the overall flavor that emerges from Table 9 is that PSM 
estimates are not substantially different from the logit estimates. 
5.4 Multinomial Logit Estimates 
Multinomial logit estimates of the effect of Plan J efes on transiting to 
employment and inactivity are displayed in Tables 10-12. The MNL estimates 
of Plan Jefes, based on Plan participants and non-applicants (fable 10, column 
5), are about 5 percentage points smaller than the effects based on the logit 
model (fable 6, column 3). Apart from this change, the differences between 
the logit and the MNL estimates are not pronoun ced, supporting the idea that 
unemployment and inactivity are two distinct states. Gender-specific estimates 
for the longer and shorter panel are presented in Tables 11 and 12, 
respectively. These estimates display that participation in PlanJefes reduces the 
probability of transiting to employment by 12 (Table 11, column 2) to 19 
(fable 12, column 2) percentage points for males and 16 (fable 12, column 5) 
to 19 (fable 11, column 5) percentage points for females. The estimates 
confirm the effect of the Plan on reducing inactivity and highlight the 
importance of controlling for this, especially for women. While the Plan has no 
influence on the labor force activity of men it tends to reduce inactivity for 
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women by 25 to 27 percentage points. Overall, based on the MNL estimates 
the effect of the Plan on males is in the same range as reported earlier, while 
for females the estimates are smaller and are now in about the same range as 
that for men. 
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper examined the effect of Plan J efes, an unemployment assistance 
program on the probability of transiting to employment between the period 
May 2002 and May 2003. Regardless of the data set, the specification, the 
empirical approach and the control group, the evidence assembled in this 
paper shows that individuals enrolled in the Plan are less likely to transit to 
employment as compared to individuals who are not on the Plan. For males, 
the lower bound of the effect of Plan J efes is about 12 percentage points 
(Table 11, column 2) while for females it is about 16 percentage points (Table 
12, column 5). Since the negative effect of the program tends to be larger for 
females, over time, the composition of program participants and indeed of the 
unemployed becomes increasingly feminized. The results presented in the 
paper also showed that Plan participants who do exit to employment tend to 
delay their exit. Most of their exits were in the period October 2002 to May 
2003. For non-participants and applicants the pattern was the opposite and 
exits were concentrated in the period May 2002 to October 2002. These results 
may be inte1preted in the context of job-search models which suggest that by 
reducing the costs of being unemployed, programs like Plan J efes raise 
reservation wages and reduce search intensity, thereby reducing the probability 
of transiting to employment. 
While the results are consistent with the supply-side effects predicted by 
job-search models, it is possible that there are demand-side factors that are 
responsible for the lower exit rate of Plan participants to employment. For 
example, Plan participants may be seeking jobs with the same intensity as non-
participants/ applicants but due to statistical discrimination/ stigmatization they 
are unable to graduate from the program. Some evidence on this possibility is 
available. In 2002, the Argentinean Ministiy of Labor conducted a survey 
among 1,290 firms which enquired whether employers w ould be willing to 
hire Plan participants if they met the qualifications required for a job. 78 
percent of the firms responded positively. Employers who were unwilling to 
hire Plan Jefes participants cited lack of skills, experience, references and tlust. 
In the case of 10 percent of the firms lack of tlust or stigmatization was the 
main reason for not hiring Plan Jefes participants. While we can't quantify the 
effect of the reluctance to hire Plan Jefes participants on our estimates, given 
the empirical evidence assembled in the paper it is hard to dismiss the supply-
side effects and the idea that the unlimited duration of Plan benefits provides 
strong incentives to remain unemployed. 
At its inception about 60 percent of the Plan participants were women and 
about 4 7 percent were household heads. Currently about 72 percent of the 
beneficiaries are females and in 2003 only about 41 percent were household 
heads. Clearly, the objective of providing a short-term safety net for 
unemployed heads of households is only partially met. At the moment, 
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individuals who are genuinely unemployed and cannot access UI are unlikely to 
receive support. On the other hand the program appears to have been 
successful in drawing women into the labor market. Notwithstanding the 
protection that the Plan provided for some households during the economic 
crisis and its role in promoting women's labor force participation, it does 
appear that Plan participants are less W{ely to transit to employment and may 
have become dependent on the Plan. 
At the moment, various plans to relocate the approximately 1 million J efes 
participants are under consideration. These include the relocation of 
participants to either a social safety program which does not focus on 
employment or a program that provides training and limited duration support 
to the genuinely unemployed. The results presented in this paper suggest that 
the Plan does indeed need to be re-visited in accordance with the objectives for 
which it was created. Reorganizing and restructuring the Plan so that it meets 
its stated goal of providing unemployment benefits and training for the short-
term unemployed while at the same time providing an alternative social 
program for the longer-term unemployed and the inactive may be an 
appropriate approach. 
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TABLE 1 
Labor market indicators, selected years a 
Year 
1991 1993 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Population (in thousands) 
Total Population -TP 28,447 29,426 32,842 33,484 34,124 34,393 
Inactive population 17,408 17,671 19, 197 19,575 19,989 20,000 
Active population - A 11 ,039 11 ,755 13,644 13,909 14, 135 14,393 
Unemployed - U 748 1,096 2,031 2,375 2,737 2,202 
Employed-E 10,291 10,660 11,613 11,534 11,397 12,191 
Underemployed - S b 963 1,092 1,972 2,178 2,696 2,647 
Rates (in percentage) c 
Activity rate - AR 39.5 41.3 42.6 42.5 42.4 42.8 
Employment rate - ER 37.0 37.3 36.2 35.2 34.1 36.2 
Unemployment rate - UR 6.5 9.6 15.1 17.4 19.7 15.6 
Underemployment rate - SR 9.4 10.2 17.0 18.9 23.7 21.7 
Informal workers d 29.7 31.3 37.7 38.3 40.9 44.8 
Notes: 
• Year averages, except for 2003 which is based on data collected in May of that year. b Employed 
individuals working less than 35 hours per week who want to work longer hours.0 Rates calculated on 
the basis of standard definitions: AR= AffP, ER= E/TP, UR= U/A, SR= S/E. d Percentage of salaried 
workers that work outside the regulated labor market. 
Source: 
Statistics are from Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security (MTESS) and are based on 
survey data. 
TABLE 2 



































Source: Based on Betranou and Bonari (20005) and administrative data from the Ministry of Labor, 
Employment and Social Security (MTESS). 
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TABLE 3 
Selected descriptive statistics, sample covering the period May 2002 to May 2003 
Full Sample Non-Plan Plan Ho: Applicants Ho: Employed 
N = 1455 N =1030 N =330 XNP =Xp N = 95 Xp =XA in May 2003 Variable Unemployed in May 2002 N= 559 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Mean p-value Mean p-value Mean Std.Dev. 
Household Head 0.39 0.487 0.35 0.47 0.001 0.52 0.461 0.474 0.499 
Male 0.58 0.493 0.65 0.34 0.000 0.61 0.000 0.729 0.444 
Age 34.11 12.23 33.9 34.3 0.700 35.6 0.274 35.0 11.90 
Married 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.34 0.574 0.35 0.972 0.36 0.480 
Primary Incomplete 0.098 0.298 0.074 0.154 0.001 0.168 0.744 0.094 0.293 
Primary Complete 0.274 0.446 0.246 0.348 0.001 0.326 0.689 0.305 0.461 
Secondary Incomplete 0.246 0.431 0.238 0.269 0.257 0.252 0.741 0.228 0.420 
Secondary Complete 0.198 0.399 0.222 0.139 0.002 0.147 0.844 0.202 0.401 
Tertiary Incomplete 0.133 0.340 0.157 0.069 0.0001 0.094 0.416 0.103 0.305 
Tertiary Complete 0.048 0.214 0.061 0.018 0.004 0.010 0.604 0.064 0.245 
Household Size 5.06 2.37 4.89 5.57 0.000 5.17 0. 179 4.874 2.342 
Nr. of children below 14 1.43 1.59 1.14 2.28 0.000 1.75 0.009 1.31 6 1.557 
Nr. Earning hh. members 1.44 1.01 1.45 1.44 0.923 1.36 0.457 1.406 1.002 
Buenos Aires 0.145 0.352 0.163 0.115 0.079 0.052 0.075 0.162 0.369 
North west 0.264 0.441 0.252 0.287 0.261 0.305 0.743 0.228 0.420 
North east 0.149 0.357 0.115 0.230 0.000 0.242 0.811 0.137 0.344 
Cuyo 0.076 0.265 0.077 0.063 0.325 0.105 0.170 0.087 0.283 
Pampa 0.268 0.443 0.277 0.248 0.345 0.242 0.899 0.254 0.435 
Patagonia 0.096 0.295 0.113 0.054 0.004 0.052 0.942 0.128 0.335 
Prior job experience • 0.863 0.343 0.852 0.924 0.031 0.884 0.284 0.867 0.339 
Last job-wage employee • 0.620 0.485 0.612 0.671 0.220 0.621 0.429 0.576 0.494 
Last job-temporary • 0.241 0.427 0.234 0.291 0.168 0.221 0.223 0.236 0.425 
Last job-ad hoc work • 0.171 0.377 0.168 0. 196 0.434 0.157 0.438 0.186 0.389 
Apartment 0.976 0.151 0.981 0.963 0.076 0.968 0.824 0.974 0.156 
Access to water and electricity 0.942 0.232 0.963 0.884 0.000 0.926 0.248 0.937 0.242 
Household size/rooms 1.937 1.336 1.737 2.470 0.000 2.256 0.249 1.885 1.272 
Notes:• For these variables the information is limited to a smaller set of 1283 observations. 
TABLE 4 
Transitions in labor market status between May 2002 and May 2003 (%) 
Full Sample 
Unemployed in May 2002, Situation in October Between October Situation in May 
N = 1,455 2002 2002 & May 2003 2003 
To Employment 413 +146 559 (28.4) (10) (38.4) 
To Unemployment 718 -159 559 (49.3) (10.9) (38.4) 
To inactivity 323 +13 336 (22.2) (0.8) (23) 
Without benefits and non-applicants 
Unemployed in May 2002, Situation in October Between October Situation in May 
N = 1,003 2002 2002 & May 2003 2003 
To Employment 363 +82 445 (36.2) (8.2) (44.3) 
To Unemployment 383 -78 305 (38.2) (7.8) (30.4) 
To inactivity 256 -4 252 (25.5) (0.4) (25.1) 
With UA 
Unemployed in May 2002, Situation in October Between October Situation in May 
N=330 2002 2002 & May 2003 2003 
To Employment 14 +48 62 (4.2) (14.6) (18.8) 
To Unemployment 263 -59 204 (79.7) (17.9) (61 .8) 
To inactivity 53 11 64 (16.1) (3.3) (19.4) 
Applicants 
Unemployed in May 2002, Situation in October Between October Situation in May 
N=95 2002 2002 & May 2003 2003 
To Employment 33 +6 39 (34.7) (6.3) (41) 
To Unemployment 48 -8 40 (50.5) (8.4) (42.1) 
To inactivity 14 +2 16 (14.7) (2.1) (16.8) 
TABLE 5 
Transitions in Labor Market Status between October 2002 and May 2003 (%) 
Without 
All benefits & With UA Applicants With UI 
non-
applicants 
Unemployed in 3,161 1,904 982 207 69 October 2002 
Labor market status in May 2003, absolute numbers (per cent) 
To Employment 974 732 147 68 27 (30.8) (38.4) (15) (32.9) (39.1) 
To Unemployment 1,444 645 692 77 31 (45.7) (33.9) (70.5) (37.2) (44.9) 
To Inactivity 742 526 143 62 11 (23.5) (27.6) (14.6) (30) (15.9) 
TABLE 6 
Logit marginal effects estimates 
Transition to employment between May 2002 and May 2003 
(standard errors) 
(3) (4) 
Variable (1) (2) Restricted to Restricted to Full Sample Full Sample UAand UAand 
Applicants Applicants 
Unemployment Assistance -0.357 ... -0.334*** -0.251··· -0.324 ... 
(0.037) (0.046) (0.070) (0.083) 
Applicant -0.108* -0.118* 
(0.060) (0.063) 
Unemployment Insurance -0.032 -0.042 
(0.084) (0.087) 
Household Head 0.095 .. 0.081* 0.107• 0.181 • 
(0.046) (0.050) (0.074) (0.111) 
Male 0.106 ... 0.071* 0.192*** 0.228*** 
(0.039) (0.043) (0.068) (0.097) 
Age 0.016* 0.012 0.045** 0.046** 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.018) (0.026) 
Age squared*100 -0.024•• -0.022* -0.064* -0.068**• 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.025) (0.034) 
Married -0.023 -0.017 -0.027 -0.011 
(0.041) (0.043) (0.058) (0.088) 
Primary Complete 0.055 0.029 0.044 -0.002 
(0.059) (0.063) (0.080) (0.105) 
Secondary Incomplete -0.015 -0.037 -0.018 -0.058 
(0.063) (0.067) (0.086) (0.112) 
Secondary Complete 0.010 -0.004 0.052 0.127 
(0.065) (0.07) (0.105) (0.162) 
Tertiary Incomplete -0.039 -0.083 -0.134 -0.216 
(0.073) (0.077) (0.091) (0.099) 
Tertiary Complete 0.131 0.105 0.239 0.498 
(0.088) (0.090) (0.294) (0.262) 
Household Size -0.009 -0.015 0.022 0.033 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.027) 
Number of children below 14 -0.0013 -0.000 -0.022 -0.044 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.027) (0.039) 
Number of earning household 0.016 0.018 0.012 0.011 
members (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) (0.046) 
0.202·· -0.308 
Prior job experience (0.088) (0.273) 
-0.109** 0.127 
Last job-wage employee (0.050) (0.109) 
-0.024 -0.135 
Last job-temporary (0.045) (0.091) 
-0.052 -0.055 
Last job-ad hoc work (0.056) (0.110) 
N 1118 982 345 209 
Log likelihood -697.34 -627.14 -175.90 -105.43 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.074 0.156 0.223 
Notes: Other regressors include a set of 5 regional indicators, controls for household wealth-type of 
housing, access to electricity and water, household members per room and indicators for size of firm of 
last job (only columns 2 and 4). *, **, ••• indicate s ignificance at the 1 O per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per 
cent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
Gender specific logit marginal effects estimates 
Transition to employment between May 2002 and May 2003 
(standard errors) 
(1) (2) (3) UAand 
(4) 
UAand Variable Full Sample Full Sample Applicants Applicants Male Female Male Female 
Unemployment Assistance -0.278*** -0.407*** -0.229* -0.396*** 
(0.066) (0.054) (0.125) (0.151) 
Applicant -0.143* -0.047 
(0.080) (0.091) 
Unemployment Insurance -0.007 -0.137 
(0.095) (0.117) 
N 674 409 112 197 
Log likelihood -429.86 -219.27 -61 .09 -68.99 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.186 0.208 0.251 
Notes: Other regressors include head of household, age and age squared, indicators for educational 
level, married, household size, number of children below 14, number of earning household members, a 
set of 5 regional indicators, controls for household wealth and characteristics of previous job (only for 
males). *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
TABLE 8 
Logit marginal effects estimates 
Transition to employment between October 2002 and May 2003 
(standard errors) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Full Full Full UA and UA and UAand Sample Sample Sample Applicants Applicants Applicants 
Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Unemployment -0.339*** -0.295*** -0.333*** -0.243*** -0.186*** -0.313*** 
Assistance (0.022) (0.035) (0.033) (0.048) (0.068) (0.109) 
Applicant 
-0.047 -0.069 -0.015 
(0.040) (0.058) (0.087) 
Unemployment 
-0.126** -0.147* -0.077 
Insurance (0.053) (0.077) (0.071) 
N 2418 1303 1115 984 336 648 
Log likelihood -1433.02 -858.93 -557.33 -457.97 -206.87 -241.28 
Pseudo R2 0.121 0.05 0.163 0.113 0.06 0.101 
Notes: Other regressors include head of household, age and age squared, indicators for educational 
level, married, household size, number of children below 14, number of earning household members, a 
set of 5 regional indicators and controls for household wealth.*, **, ••• indicate significance at the 10 per 
cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 9 
Transition to employment 
5 Nearest neighbors matching estimates-restricted to common support 
(standard errors) 
Transition between (1) (2) (3) 
May 2002 & May 2003 Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Male Female 
Effect of Unemployment Assistance -0.323*** -0.234*** -0.370*** 
(0.048) (0.063) (0.071) 
N 1116 693 402 
Transition between Restricted to UA Restricted to UA Restricted to UA 
May 2002 & May 2003 & Applicants & Applicants and Applicants 
Effect of Unemployment Assistance -0.349*** -0.168* -0.431*** 
(0.078) (0.100) (0.071) 
N 340 131 176 
Transition between Full Sample Full Sample Full ~ample 
October 2002 & May 2003 Male Female 
Effect of Unemployment Assistance -0.382*** -0.305*** -0.369*** 
(0.035) (0.039) (0.055) 
N 2415 1299 1115 
Transition between Restricted to UA Restricted to UA Restricted to UA 
October 2002 & May 2003 & Applicants & Applicants & Applicants 
Effect of Unemployment Assistance -0.369*** -0.262*** -0.411 *** 
(0.065) (0.085) (0.094) 
N 947 336 604 
Notes: Propensity scores were obtained from a logit regression of Plan Jefes on head of household, age 
and age squared, indicators for educational level, married, household size, number of children below 
14, number of earning household members, a set of 5 regional indicators, and controls for household 
wealth. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
Estimates based on kernel matching displayed a similar pattern. 
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TABLE10 
Select multinomial logit marginal effects estimates - Transitions between May 2002 and May 2003 
Full Sample 
Remain Transition to 
Unemployed Employment 
(1) (2) 
Unemployment Assistance 0.333*** -0.262*** 
(0.034) (0.030) 
Applicant 0.142*** -0.055 
(0.056) (0.052) 
Unemployment Insurance 0.063 0.014 
(0.080) (0.074) 
Household Head -0.044 0.1 17*** 
(0.039) (0.040) 
Male 0.006 0.169 ... 
(0.032) (0.031 ) 
Age 0.004 0.029-
(0.008) (0.008) 
Married 0.002 -0.037 
(0.034) (0.034) 
Tertiary Incomplete 0.009 -0.069 
(0.061) (0.059) 
Tertiary Complete -0.073 0.171** 
(0.077) (0.082) 
Household Size 0.017* 0.001 
(0.010) (0.011) 
Number of earning household -0.025* 0.002 
members (0.015) (0.016) 
N 1454 
Log-Likelihood -1408.03 





























































































Notes: Other regressors include number of children younger than 14, a set of 5 regional indicators, controls for household wealth-type of housing, access to electricity and water, household 
members per room. *, **, ***indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels, respectively . 
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TABLE11 
Select multinomial logit marginal effects estimates - Transitions between 
May 2002 and May 2003 
Full Sample - Male Full Sample - Female 
Remain Transition to Transition to Remain Transition to Transition to 
Unemployed Employment Inactivity Unemployed Employment Inactivity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Unemployment 
Assistance 0.221*** -0.248*** 0.027 0.421 ••• -0.195••• -0.249••• 
(0.055) (0.049) (0.044) (0.048) (0.039) (0.050) 
Applicant 0.114 -0.125* 0.010 0.188** 0.061 -0.225••• 
(0.072) (0.069) (0.049) (0.091) (0.081) (0.045) 
Unemployment -0.007 0.019 -0.027 0.232 -0.040 -0.192* 
Insurance (0.085) (0.087) (0.043) (0.16) (0.109) (0.112) 
N 846 608 
Log-Likelihood -793.17 -575.45 
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.12 
TABLE12 
Select multinomial logit marginal effects estimates - Transitions between 
October 2002 and May 2003 
Full Sample - Male Full Sample - Female 
Remain Transition to Transition to Remain Transition to Transition to 
unemployed employment inactivity unemployed employment inactivity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Unemployment 
Assistance 0.281··· -0.245*** -0.036 0.431*** -0.158**• -0.212··· 
(0.034) (0.031) (0.024) (0.029) (0.023) (0.027) 
Applicant 0.070 -0.053 -0.017 0.023 -0.009 -0.014 
(0.053) (0.052) (0.031) (0.057) (0.038) (0.047) 
Unemployment 0.118 -0.128 0.011 0.099 -0.043 -0.057 
Insurance (0.078) (0.068)* (0.062) (0.1 1) (0.058) (0.093) 
N 1574 1586 
Log-Likelihood -1484.29 -1428.53 
PseudoR2 0.087 0.12 
Notes to Table 12: Other regressors include head of household, age and age squared , indicators for 
educational level, married, household size, number of children below 14, number of earning household 
members, a set of 5 regional indicators, controls for previous job characteristics (only Table 1 Oa) and 
household wealth. •, ••, ••• indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels, 
respectively. 
TABLE A1 
Comparison of the individual and merged data sets 
May 2002 Oct. 2002 May 2003 3 Rounds 2 Rounds 
N 50,712 50,782 37,510 11,147 21 ,292 
Male(%) 47.8 47.5 47.5 47.8 47.5 
Primary(%) 30.8 30.6 29.9 30.3 30.8 
Secondary(%) 43.3 44.6 44.1 44.7 45.0 
Tertiary(%) 25.9 24.8 26.0 24.9 24.2 
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TABLE A2 
Selected descriptive statistics - Sample covering the period October 2002 to May 2003 
Full Sample Non-Plan Plan Ho: Applicants Ho: Employed 
N = 3161 N =1904 N = 982 XNP =Xr N =207 Xp =XA in May 2003 Variable Unemployed in October N= 974 
2002 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Mean p-value Mean p-value Mean Std.Dev. 
Household Head 0.34 0.475 0.30 0.41 0.000 0.39 0.709 0.446 0.497 
Male 0.49 0.500 0.60 0.28 0.000 0.49 0.000 0.674 0.468 
Age 33.37 11 .96 32.5 34.6 0.000 33.5 0.186 34.0 11 .55 
Married 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.34 0.237 0.36 0.279 0.33 0.471 
Primary Incomplete 0.108 0.311 0.085 0.155 0.000 0.121 0.211 0.102 0.304 
Primary Complete 0.269 0.443 0.234 0.341 0.000 0.261 0.025 0.280 0.449 
Secondary Incomplete 0.270 0.444 0.267 0.271 0.952 0.314 0.208 0.249 0.433 
Secondary Complete 0.180 0.385 0.200 0.143 0.000 0.1 54 0.683 0.174 0.379 
Tertiary Incomplete 0.123 0.329 0.150 0.071 0.000 0.125 0.009 0.121 0.326 
Tertiary Complete 0.047 0.212 0.063 0.018 0.000 0.024 0.581 0.072 0.258 
Household Size 5.13 2.46 4.87 5.65 0.000 5.40 0.201 4.904 2.554 
Nr. of children below 14 1.54 1.64 1.15 2.30 0.000 1.73 0.000 1.373 1.566 
Nr. earning hh. members 1.75 1.15 1.58 2.08 0.000 1.61 0.055 1.645 1.170 
Buenos Aires 0.122 0.328 0.149 0.078 0.000 0.043 O.D78 0.140 0.347 
North west 0.262 0.440 0.231 0.300 0.001 0.411 0.002 0.224 0.418 
North east 0.144 0.351 0.096 0.228 0.000 0.198 0.346 0.113 0.317 
Cuyo 0.069 0.254 0.070 0.064 0.446 0.077 0.491 0.065 0.248 
Pampa 0.272 0.445 0.296 0.248 0.048 0.174 0.022 0.283 0.451 
Patagonia 0.129 0.336 0.157 0.080 0.000 0.096 0.444 0.172 0.377 
Apartment 0.968 0.175 0.977 0.950 0.000 0.971 0.193 0.974 0.158 
Access to water and electricity 0.929 0.257 0.948 0.891 0.000 0.927 0.116 0.951 0.216 
Household size/room 2.056 1.308 1.793 2.568 0.000 2.225 0.002 1.906 1.202 
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TABLE A3 
Select multinomial log it marginal effects estimates - Transitions between 
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Notes: Other regressors include head of household, age and age squared, indicators for educational 
level, married, household size, number of children below 14, number of earning household members, a 
set of 5 regional indicators, controls and household wealth.*,**,••• indicate significance at the 10 per 
cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
TABLE A4 
Selection corrected probit marginal effects estimates 
Transition to employment between October 2002 and May 2003 
(standard errors) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Variable Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample 
Total Male Female 
Unemployment Assistance -0.41 O*** -0.389*** -0.307'** 
(0.052) (0.105) . (0.073) 
Applicant -0.047 -0.067 -0.019 
(0.041) (0.058) (0.056) 
Unemployment Insurance -0.118* -0.135* -0.067 
(0.058) (0.078) (0.085) 
Generalised Residual 0.062 O.Q75 -0.025 
(0.043) (0.081) (0.050) 
N 2418 1303 1115 
Log likelihood -1437.15 -861.47 -561.77 
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.05 0.156 
Notes: Other regressors include head of household, age and age squared, indicators for educational 
level, married, and a set of 5 regional indicators. The generalised residual is obtained from a first-step 
probit regression of program participation on observed characteristics. Identification is achieved by 
including variables that capture household wealth (type of housing, access to electricity and water, 
household members per room) and number of children below the age of 14, family size and number of 
earning household members only in the first-step equation. *, **, ***indicate significance at the 10 per 
cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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FIGURE 1 
Distribution of propensity scores for Jefes participants (treated) and applicants 
(untreated) - Panel data covering the period May 2002 to May 2003 
.125 .25 .375 .5 .625 .75 .875 
Propensity Score 
!:::::==::::' Untreated 
I Treated: Off support 
Treated: On support 
FIGURE 2 
Distribution of propensity scores for Jefes participants (treated) and applicants 
(untreated) - Panel data covering the period October 2002 to May 2003 
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